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This article investigates the relationship between work-group members’ cognitive style (as
measured by Allinson and Hayes’s Cognitive Style Index), the group’s task and setting, and
the way in which group members behave in the group. Behavior of a homogeneous analytic, a
homogeneous intuitive, and a heterogeneous group was observed in a mechanistic setting
and analyzed using discourse analysis. This study is discussed in light of a previous study in
which homogeneous analytic and homogeneous intuitive groups worked in an organic set-
ting. These two studies use different methodologies (quantitative approach versus qualitative-
discursive). The benefits of methodological eclecticism are discussed.
Keywords: group work; teamwork; group processes; cognitive style; multiple paradigms
Although many studies have reported considerable improvement
in organizational life since the introduction of teamwork, some
organization theorists and organization managers have experi-
enced difficulties in getting groups to work as effectively as theo-
rists and organizations would expect (Sinclair, 1992; Schrage,
1995). This article addresses the possibility that the individual style
in which members approach their work and the type of tasks that
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groups have to perform may be strongly linked to the overall group
functioning (Gruenfeld & Lin, 1984; Leonard & Straus, 1997).
GROUP INTERACTION AND PROCESSES
The nature of group interactions that occur in a work group pro-
vides insight into how that group addresses its task more or less
effectively. The interaction behavior of a group indicates the ways
in which group members work together to complete the task suc-
cessfully. In general, interaction patterns refer to how the group
members pool their abilities in a collaborative context to reach the
best decision (Hackman & Morris, 1975). Clinicians among others,
provide evidence that decision making is a poor indicator of work
and that the focus should be on the process by which the decision is
reached rather than simply the decision itself (Bion, 1961; Janis,
1972; Turk & Salovey, 1988).
In elaborating the construct of group process, researchers have
distinguished between task-oriented and social-oriented behavior
(e.g., Bales, 1950; Bales, Cohen, & Williamson, 1979; Ellis &
Fisher, 1994; Jaques, 1991; Littlepage, Cowart, & Kerr, 1989;
Zaccaro, 1991; Zaccaro & Lowe, 1988). Ellis and Fisher (1994)
identify the task dimension as “the relationship between group
members and the work they are to perform—the work they have to
do and how they go about doing it.” They refer to the social dimen-
sion as “the relationship of group members with one another—how
they feel toward one another and about their membership in the
group” (p. 22). In describing his system of categories (IPA), Bales
(1950) identifies an area of task problems and an area of social-
emotional problems. He acknowledges
The idealised interaction process would then be described as one of
alternating emphasis on the two problems. An abstract way to
describe this alternation is to regard the problems in the task area as
primarily Adaptive-Instrumental in significance, while the
problems in the social-emotional area are primarily Integrative-
Expressive in significance. (pp. 9-10)
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Bales recognizes this as a very generalized and abstract way of con-
ceiving the problem-solving nature of social interaction, but he
believes it to be one of great theoretical relevance.
Implicit in these positions is the recognition that the task and the
social areas are not practically separated and alternated from each
other. As Ellis and Fisher (1994) point out, the task and social
dimensions of group process are inseparable and highly interde-
pendent, despite the general tendency to separate them and see
them in conflict with each other. “Although they may be separated
theoretically, the task and social dimensions exert mutual and
reciprocal influence on each other and are thus virtually insepara-
ble in practice” (p. 51).
Napier and Gershenfeld (1984) address the issue of group inter-
action in terms of role type. Task roles are those that determine the
group selection and definition of common goals and the working
toward solution of those goals (Napier & Gershenfeld, 1984, p.
145), whereas socioemotional roles focus on the personal relation-
ship between group members. Similarly, Jaques (1991) classifies
group functions as group-building and maintenance roles and
group-task roles. The former refers to those roles that contribute to
building relationships and cohesiveness among members, and the
latter to those that help the group do its work.
The concept of team role is central in the work of Belbin (1981,
1993). His classical study on team roles focuses on individual
behavior in groups and is important also for its applied aspects. He
originally identified eight key team roles (in 1993, he added the
ninth role to the list) as a result of more than 9 years of research in
which he studied 120 management teams involved in a manage-
ment game. The role indicates the tendency in behavior of an indi-
vidual within a group. Next to a primary role, Belbin recognizes the
existence of a back-up role, which the individual should shift to if,
for some reason, there is less group need for the primary role. Each
role is determined by personal attributes and characteristics; in fact,
Belbin’s work was initially based on the classification of team
members according to various personality types based on the work
of Jung.
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Belbin (1981) suggests that heterogeneity of roles/personal
approaches is necessary for the team to perform well. Pure homo-
geneous teams, according to Belbin, have merits that give them
advantages in particular situations. However, they are susceptible
to particular weaknesses because the natural balancing qualities
found in groups with different members are absent. Belbin
acknowledges that it is important “to have in a team those people
who possess strengths or characteristics which serve a need with-
out duplicating those already there.” He states that any shortcoming
in performance by a team usually reflects the fault inherent in the
team composition. “Team is a question of balance. What is needed
is not well-balanced individuals but individuals who balance well
with one another” (p. 77).
COGNITIVE STYLE
Cognitive style refers to individual differences in the way people
approach the external environment. Witkin and Goodenough
(1977) acknowledge that cognitive styles refer to individual differ-
ences in how people perceive, think, solve problems, learn, and
relate to others and that they are concerned with the form rather
then the content of activity. In wider terms, Miller (1987) defines
cognitive style as a “broad disposition and higher-order meta-strat-
egies that influence the individual’s attempts to adjust to situational
demands” (p. 253).
The concept of cognitive style has been investigated from many
different perspectives, and a considerable number of dimensions
have been reported in attempting to define the construct. Some
examples include Witkin’s field dependence/independence (Witkin,
Goodenough, & Karp, 1967); Riding and Cheema’s (1991) wholist/
analytic; Kirton’s (1976) adaptors/innovators and Allinson and
Hayes’s (1996) intuition/analysis. To resolve this lack of clarity
among the numerous dimensions, it has been argued that the vari-
ous cognitive style labels are based on similar underlying con-
structs (Kogan, 1983; Miller, 1987) and that these different concep-
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tions should be integrated into one single model (Riding, Glass, &
Douglas, 1993; Riding & Rayner, 1998). Allinson and Hayes
(1996) attempted to do so and elaborated a measure of cognitive
style that has been developed from 18 separate dimensions. They
claim that the development of a strong instrument that is based on
several dimensions (as is their Cognitive Style Index, CSI) can
assess the superordinate construct to which the different dimen-
sions refer. Allinson and Hayes represent this construct as one
dimension, and the two extremes are labeled intuition and analysis.
The authors also give a definition of the two extreme types and
acknowledge, “Intuition refers to immediate judgement based on
feeling and the adoption of a global perspective”; whereas “analy-
sis refers to judgement based on mental reasoning and a focus on
detail.” Thus,
intuitivists tend to be relatively nonconformist, prefer an open-
ended approach to problem solving, rely on random methods of
exploration, remember spatial images most easily, and work best
with ideas requiring overall assessment. Analysts tend to be more
compliant, favour a structured approach to problem solving, depend
on systematic methods of investigation, recall verbal material most
readily and are especially comfortable with ideas requiring step by
step analysis. (p. 122)
According to Allinson and Hayes (1996) and to previous studies
reported in the literature (e.g., Kirton, 1976; Riding et al., 1993;
Witkin et al., 1967), analytic individuals are serialistic and analyti-
cal in their cognitive behavior, self-controlled in their emotional
behavior, and instrumentally oriented in their interpersonal behav-
ior. Conversely, intuitive individuals are wholistic in their cognitive
behavior, warm and spontaneous in their emotional behavior, and
expressive in their interpersonal behavior (see also Gruenfeld &
Lin, 1984). In a group situation, it is therefore expected that ana-
lytic individuals focus predominantly on task functions and roles,
whereas intuitive individuals are more social-emotional oriented.
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THE STUDY
The present study evolved from a previously reported examina-
tion of the relationship between individual cognitive style and
group processes (task and social behavior) in the real work environ-
ment (see Armstrong & Priola, 2001). Groups of undergraduate
computing and information technology students were engaged in
an organic task in which they were expected to work on the design,
development, building, documentation, and delivery of a computer-
based system for a local organization. It was found that intuitive indi-
viduals and homogeneous intuitive teams initiate more socially ori-
ented behaviors, as was hypothesized. However, there was no evi-
dence that analytic individuals and homogeneous analytic teams
are more likely to engage in task-oriented behaviors. Intuitive indi-
viduals and homogeneous intuitive teams were also found to initi-
ate more task-oriented behaviors.
As acknowledged by Gruenfeld and Lin (1984), previous stud-
ies that have shown that analytics are task oriented whereas intui-
tives are expressive and socially oriented, are based on observation
of behavior in a well-structured and mechanistic environment (gen-
erally a laboratory setting). Their study showed that in an organic
setting, intuitive subjects “behaved in a responsive, task-oriented
mode, while analytics behaved in a socio-emotional rebellious and
resistant mode” (p. 721). Gruenfeld and Lin’s study implies that a
different capacity is required to interact in two different environ-
ments, such as the organic and the mechanistic. The nature of the
team-work task, studied by Armstrong and Priola (2001), was
organic and open ended. The present study is designed to explore
the relationship between cognitive style and group behavior, where
the task is essentially mechanistic.
COMPOSITION OF GROUPS
The sample was composed of 18 participants working in three
groups composed of 6 members each. Participants were undergrad-
uate students enrolled in three different degree courses in a univer-
sity in the northeast of England. Their ages varied between 18 and
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34 years, and they were all Europeans, excluding 2 who were Chi-
nese but had grown up and had been educated in Britain. The sub-
jects were chosen according to their cognitive style score, mea-
sured with the CSI (Allinson & Hayes, 1996), whose scores range
from 0 to 76. A high score indicates an analytic style and a low
score an intuitive style.1 Although gender was not a feature of the
research, an equal number of female and male participants were
assigned to each group. Table 1 illustrates the composition of the
groups.
PROBLEM-SOLVING TASK
Subjects were asked to solve a problem characterized by a list of
hints, which, if processed systematically, should have led to the
right solution. The task was a problem-solving exercise titled
“Who is the engine driver?”2 The exercise presented all the relevant
facts of the matter, and groups had to agree on the solution. The
problem asked group members to identify the names of the train
driver, the train guard, and the ticket inspector—named Brown,
White, and Green—and the names of three passengers—business-
men who are also named Mr. Brown, Mr. White, and Mr. Green. It
had to be solved in 40 minutes and was denoted by strictly defined
steps; it contained a set of constraints and clues to follow in order to
provide the only correct solution.
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TABLE 1: Group Composition









Heterogeneous 6 participants (3 female/
3 male): 2 analytics
(1 F/1 M), 2 bimodals
(1 F/1 M), 2 intuitiv-
ists (1 F/1 M)
Between 68 and
18
F and L: psychology; M,
J, W, and P: business




M and P: business; J, C,
CL, and K: psychology
NOTE: CSI = Cognitive Style Index
DATA-COLLECTION STRATEGY
Groups were video-recorded while engaged in the problem-
solving situation, which lasted for circa 40 minutes. Additionally,
groups were interviewed at the completion of the task. The group
interview, whose duration was approximately 15 minutes, was also
video-recorded. Videos were subsequently transcribed using
Sbisa’s (1992) notation system, and the discourse analysis was
applied to the entire corpus of data.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Discourse analysis has been chosen as a method for assigning
meaning to communication occurring in a work group. It has been
applied to transcriptions of group problem-solving and group inter-
views with the objective of identifying how, from the observation
of the communication process, we can make inferences on the rela-
tionship between individual cognitive styles and group behavior.
Discursive research has traditionally left apart the study of indi-
vidual differences because it focuses on realities that are socially
constructed in the interaction of the parts involved in the discourse/
communication. The next sections represent an attempt to imple-
ment the discourse analysis as an observation method within a
multiparadigm approach to research (this “divergent” strategy to
research applies qualitative methods of analysis to data gathered in
a laboratory setting).
The approach of discourse analysis looks at discourse, and more
generally at communication, not as a neutral transmitter of infor-
mation, but rather as a social practice in which “ready-made
resources” (common sense) and individual resources structure the
ways we think and talk about the world (Potter & Wetherell, 1989).
According to Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor, and Tindall (1994),
“Discourse analysis treats the social world as a text, or rather as a
system of texts which can be systematically ‘read’ by a researcher
to lay open the psychological processes that lie within them” (p.
92). Within the context of this study, the authors, through the analy-
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sis of discourse, look at how the nature of our knowledge about
cognitive style shapes the work groups’ problem solving.
According to Fairclough (1992), there is not a set procedure for
doing discourse analysis. In the present study, the authors have
combined the analysis of the content and the form of the text with
the identification and analysis of the organization of features pres-
ent in the texts (see also Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The analysis
therefore aims, first, to identify linguistic dispositions, which refer
to ideas, terms, and themes organized around one or more key met-
aphors. Second, it aims to highlight the accounts and resources that
group members use to explain or justify their behaviors.
In the sections that follow, extracts from three work groups and
group interview situations (homogeneous intuitive group, homo-
geneous analytic group, and heterogeneous group) are presented
and combined together to constitute the accounts to which they
refer. For each group, a parallel analysis of accounting practices
and text content was conducted. Accounts are then examined to
observe the influence of cognitive style on group interactions. Lan-
guage analysis is a complex activity that incorporates many types
and techniques of analysis. The analysis of discourse simulta-
neously addresses questions of form and questions of meaning
(Fairclough, 1992). In the discourse analysis that follows, the anal-
ysis of text (description and interpretation) is constantly alternated
with the analysis of the particular discourse that is drawn upon by
participants.
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: GENERAL FINDINGS
From the coding phase, in which the whole corpus of data was
scanned for particular topics and features, three different linguistic
dispositions emerged in the three groups: the intuition disposition
in the intuitive group; the analysis disposition in the analytic group,
and the dissent disposition in the heterogeneous group. There was
no evidence of the existence of one of these linguistic dispositions
in more than one group.
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It was found that both the analytic and the intuitive groups
account for the group unity and cohesiveness existing between
their members. The first group was characterized by intuition
homogeneity (see Table 1). As it can be seen in the discourse analy-
sis presented below, the group showed a particular approach to the
task that the authors defined as intuitive, based on feeling rather
than rationality. Also, group members often referred to their inabil-
ity to apply the type of logical analysis that was required to solve
the problem and failed in providing the right solution. Conversely,
the second group was characterized by analytic homogeneity (see
Table 1). As shown in the analysis that follows, the group immedi-
ately approached the problem implementing principles of logic.
They seemed at ease with the task and found the correct solution
within the given time. What characterized the heterogeneous
group, compared with the two previous groups, was the display of
strong disagreement between members. At some points during the
exercise, participants seemed to have reached a solution, when sud-
denly they withdrew and renegotiated that conclusion. This process
was repeated several times, and the conflict was particularly strong
between two group members: P and L. At the end, the group
provided the correct solution, but not all members were satisfied.
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE INTUITIVE GROUP3
The analysis starts with the identification of the different fea-
tures that characterize what we called the intuition disposition. To
do this, we should focus on accounts that make direct reference to
intuition and the intuitivist explanation; this is intended as the
modality in which decisions and judgments are based on feelings
rather than on rational processes. Accounts are also examined look-
ing at inconsistencies, which exist between the reasons proposed by
group members for using intuition in a problem-solving situation.
Extract 1 (Intuitivist-Exercise)
1. K: is just (-) doesn’t
2. C: he is (—) he is (—) definitely the guard then (_) Brown is defi-
nitely the guard
3. K: no::
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4. C: right (—) oh gosh (-) it doesn’t make sense (_) what’s wrong, (-)
right ignore that he’s not the guard (xxx) the ticket inspector (-)
they can’t both (_) be the driver (-) I think that it isn’t ticket inspec-
tor (-) isn’t the driver (_) he’s the guard (-) but not ask me the
explanation
5. CL: (xxx)
6. C: no:: (-) it’s (_) there is a theory behind (-) I used elimination (_) I
don’t know why I came with (-) it’s just like (—) I just think it is
7. CL: (xxx) Brown could be the guard (-) or the train driver then (-)
we don’t know which one (_) it’s fifty-fifty really
In E1, after K doubts about C’s proposal that Brown may be the
guard, C goes on explaining why she thinks that Brown is the guard,
saying that she has a “theory” and that she worked through elimina-
tion. However, because she cannot give a logical explanation, she
says that she does not know how and why she reached that solution but
“thinks” it is right. Her attempt to solve the incongruence is argumen-
tatively weak (she just thinks he is) but rhetorically effective in per-
suading CL, who initially leaves the solution open to the two alterna-
tives (E1, L7), but later in the exercise, she seems persuaded.
Extract 2 (Intuitivist-Exercise)
8. C: have we agreed that Brown is the guard?
9. CL: ((she moves her hands and her head meaning “so so”))
10. C: oh (-) I think he is
11. ((C, K, and CL laugh))
12. K: it sounds like a guard’s name (-) doesn’t it? ((she laughs))
13. CL: we have got Brown is the guard (-) we give it fifty-fifty chance
(-) we could guess
14. K: why?
15. CL: because (-) we are never going to find it
16. K: ((she laughs)) we are never going to find it logically (-) so just (-)
we might as well do it (-) as what we feel like
17. C: am::::
18. CL: I think (_) o no:: (-) uhm:: (_) no (-) it’s wrong
19. K: what were you going to say?
20. CL: ((she shakes her head))
21. K: ((she laughs)) (_ _) it could
22. CL: that Green was the ticket inspector
23. K: why?
24. CL: we don’t know
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In E2, the intuition disposition is present with different features.
The first feature worth noting is that here participants are not trying
to find a logical explanation for justifying their choices. CL sug-
gests, “we could guess,” and K, “we might . . . do it as what we feel
like,” using their feelings to give a solution because they “are never
going to find it logically.” L15 and L16 are examples of extreme
case formulations, Pomerantz’s (1986) phrase for statements
where the very extreme possibility is stated. Extreme case formula-
tions generally work to make a statement more rhetorically effec-
tive through the use of some form of exaggeration or overstate-
ment. In this case, with “we are never going to find it” and “we are
never going to find it logically,” CL and K refer to the extreme and
negative possibility of finding the solution to the problem—in gen-
eral in CL’s case, and in a logical way for K. In doing so, they give a
reason for using their feelings to arrive at a solution to the problem.
Furthermore, in E2, L22-24, CL suggests that Green is the ticket
inspector, admitting that she does not know why she said that and
even not attempting to provide any sort of justification. An interest-
ing point to note is the use of the plural pronoun we by CL, which
could be interpreted in different ways. We can see it as the notion of
belonging to the group, in other words, as an indicator of group
identity. Earlier, during their meeting, the difficulty of applying
logical reasoning to the problem has risen a few times. All group
members are experiencing the same frustration, and CL simply
feels the communalism of her own experience and recognizes that
they are all collaborating together, even though she is not providing
them with a new insight. In addition, we can see it as a way of with-
drawing her responsibilities for her own statement and sharing
them with the rest of the group. CL initially expresses her beliefs
using “I think” (L18), but when asked why she thinks that, she uses
the pronoun we as if the others were part of her way of thinking, as
if they were sharing the same thoughts.
During the group exercise, the existence of the intuition disposi-
tion is shown in two dimensions. First, the intuition disposition is
shown in its struggle to achieve and demonstrate its way of working
in a sort of logical and explainable modality; this, however, cannot
be achieved because of its nature. With regard to this, participants
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stated “there is a theory behind, I used elimination, I don’t know
why I came with, it’s just like, I just think it is” (E1, L6). Second,
the intuition disposition is present in its feeling dimension (e.g., C:
“it’s hard to explain, isn’t it?” CL replies: “I’ve just got a feeling”).
The same account is represented in the group interview, which
followed the problem-solving exercise. The account is, however,
linked to the particular resources that group members draw on to
justify their failure in solving the problem. Examination of the
interview transcript revealed another common or collective theme:
the claim that group members’ problem-solving style did not coin-
cide with the task characteristics. The form of talk is both descrip-
tive (they describe themselves and the way in which they approach
problems) and evaluative (they evaluate the demands of the task
and justify the fact that they could not solve it).
During the interview, group members give justifications of their
failure in solving the problem. They suggest that they tried to solve
it logically, but it did not work, that they “have exhausted every-
thing” and “have tried all the avenues that they could.” In describ-
ing their behavior, they imply that the reasons for not providing the
correct solution cannot be attributed to group members but may lie
in the assignment.
In fact, they suggest that while involved in the task solution, it
was not important whether they could solve it; what mattered was
the compatibilities between them and the task: “whether it clicked.”
CL explicitly admits that they never established a way of working
on the task: “we never did that,” “we could never.” As a defensive
stance, she indirectly suggests once more and without committing
group members that the cause of the incompatibility may lie in the
characteristics of the task.
At this point, it appears necessary to make a reference to the
notion of locus of control (Rotter, 1966).4 The notion refers to the
dispositional or situational attribution of responsibility of events.
In other words, individuals who believe that events that happen to
them are contingent on their own action are considered to have an
internal locus of control, whereas those people who believe that
whatever happens is the result of fate, luck, or the actions of others
have an external locus of control. It also appears clear to the reader
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the resemblance that the notion has with Witkin’s (1976) field-
dependent-independent dimension—more specifically, the sim-
ilarities between the external locus of control and the field-
dependent (intuitivist), and the internal locus of control and the
field-independent (analytic) types.
Referring back to the analysis, the external attribution of the
group members can be seen as an approach to the environment that is
external, field dependent, and intuitivist following Rotter’s (1966),
Witkin and Goodenough’s (1977), and Allinson and Hayes’s (1996)
terminology.
Extract 3 (Intuitivist-Interview)
25. M: I just feel is a bit too (-) I think is a bit too biased for people who
are analytical (-) it seems is more like a logical exercise
26. CL: into maths (-) yeah (-) I felt that (-) yeah
27. M: yeah
28. Int.: did you feel uncomfortable about that?
29. M: not really (-) I was looking and think (-) I was staring and then
after a while
30. CL: nothing came
31. C: it was embarrassing when you are like *you don’t know when to
start+
32. M: *there were signs+ and then you think what happen next (-) you
know
33. Int.: yes (-) you said (-) this is more for analytics or whatever
34. M: uhm
35. Int.: and don’t you feel to be like that?
36. M: I mean
37. CL: partially (-) but not as much as for this
38. M: I think that the exercise should have been more (-) a bit between
the two (-) I think this was more logical than:: (—) yeah more
analytical
39. ((K and CL assert with their heads))
40. M: because as I said (-) I mean we went down the logical route and
we got stacked (-) so we went down on the assumption route and we
got stacked again
41. ((K and CL assert with their heads))
42. M: so we weren’t exactly sure which was the route to take (_) I sup-
pose I was a little bit uncomfortable but that was basically because I
just couldn’t get the answer (-) it wasn’t coming immediately
43. C: you’ve got to have a system for working with things like that
44. M: uhm uhm
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45. C: and I have got no way how to do it (-) we don’t
There is ample evidence of the intuition disposition within the
above extract. The task is seen to be “too biased for people who are
analytical” (L25). This sentence indicates that the speaker (M) has
already done some work to find a way of justifying their approach
to the problem. The choice of the vocabulary used also confirms
M’s authoritarian claim. As we can see in L25 and L38, in describ-
ing the exercise, M uses words such as “analytical” and “logical,”
which seem to give him a higher status compared with the other
group members whose vocabulary is much more common and
simple.
The account of intuition is produced in the same extract with a
different feature. What is interesting about these accounts is that
participants appeal to a set of different resources to attribute the
cause of their difficulties (in dealing with the problem and in
getting the wrong answer) to other rather than themselves (e.g., task
characteristics and incompatibilities between these and their problem-
solving approach). Furthermore, group members confirm with their
statements what has been reported in the literature, that intuitivist
people are impulsive and quick in reaching conclusions. In L30 and
L42, CL and M say “nothing came” and “it wasn’t coming immedi-
ately” as the solution should come as an insight more than being the
result of a systematic analysis of the problem.
Regarding this point, the last three lines of the extract are also
very interesting. In L43, C affirms, and M agrees, that a “system” is
required to work with such problems. Although she does not spe-
cifically mention which kind of system she refers to, it is however
implicit that it is a system of analysis, and therefore an intuitive
approach cannot be successfully applied to this kind of problem. In
L45, C continues saying that she does not know the way to do it,
shifting from the first person singular, used in the first part of the
sentence, to the plural “we.” Here she accounts for her own difficul-
ties, but she also commits the rest of the group to the same struggle
in adapting to the problem.
Extract 4 (Intuitivist-Interview)
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46. C: we all understood where each other was going on about the way
47. K: yeah
48. C: we got it wrong
49. K: yeah
50. C: we were all alike
51. M: you can say how the thought process work but it just seems to
52. C: we all have the same thought process
In the extract above, the account presented is only indirectly
related to the intuition disposition. This extract is interesting
because it provides yet more evidence of the homogeneity existing
in the group, they are all well-tuned to each other, they “all under-
stood where each other was going on” (L46). Later in the extract, C
expresses the same idea of group unity as similarity between them:
“we were all alike, we all have the same thought process” (L50 and
L52).
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE ANALYTIC GROUP
In the first part of the analysis, group members are working to
solve a problem. Accounts are identified with the aim of observing
different possible themes and the diverse features in which group
members deploy the same theme. In the second part, members are
talking about their experience in the group; here, accounts are ana-
lyzed in the light of the construction of the different versions of the
work group.
Throughout the transcripts of the work group, the approach that
group members apply in solving the problem is clear. At the begin-
ning of the meeting, they immediately get involved in the task and
try to identify the facts of the problem. Below are some extracts that
show the kind of precise analysis members are engaged in through-
out the whole duration of the meeting.
Extract 5 (Analytic-Exercise)
1. E: ((he starts drawing)) so the information we have here is (-) Mr
White that’s the business man
2. T: uhm uhm
3. E: lives in Manchester (-) so Manchester is here (-) this is Mr White
4. T: uhm uhm
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5. E: and the guard lives exactly halfway between London and
Manchester
6. A: here
7. E: and here is London
8. A: halfway
9. E: that’s the guard
10. ((AL starts writing))
In the extract above, the group starts collaborating in placing the
various information they possess on the base of the drawing that E
is doing after having examined the facts in detail. This is repre-
sented as a map of Britain, in which the characters of the exercise
are located in the various cities where they live. This group effort is
an indication of the starting point from where participants are
approaching the problem. They are not only analyzing the data
but also working to have an immediate perception, that is, the
visual idea of the situation.
Extract 6 (Analytic-Exercise)
11. E: I think (-) the firm fact that we have so far is this one
12. T: uhm uhm
13. E: Mr Brown definitely is not inspector
14. G: yes we have
15. E: so we have to make assumptions (_) for example Brown defi-
nitely would be either the guard or the driver
16. T: uhm uhm
17. G: uhm uhm
18. E: ’cause we’ve got fifty percent
19. T: we’ll have to focus on who Brown is (-) because we need to find
out who the engine driver is
20. E: ’cause this person actually has the highest chance to be assign to
the driver
An interesting feature present in the above extract regards the
application of logical principles. In fact, in E6, E is engaged in a
logical process in which from the certain facts (premises), he draws
the possible conclusions of the problem. His argument takes the
shape of logical reasoning following the rules of deductive argu-
ments. The structure of the argument, given by the relations
between the elements, is the following: If Brown is not the inspec-
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tor, then he is either the guard or the driver; therefore, he is the one
who has the highest probability (50%) of being the driver, com-
pared with the other two (White and Green), who have a third of the
total probability. E’s logical reasoning finds the consent of the rest
of the group, who agree and seem to follow his argument easily.
Extract 7 (Analytic-Exercise)
21. E: yeah (-) point five (-) basically I think Mr (-) sorry Brown either
the guard or the driver beats the ticket inspector OK? (-) so at least
we know fifty percent and fifty percent OK? (-) so far that is what
we know (-) and last piece of information I think should be also
quite variable (-) sorry valuable (-) because the passenger whose
name is the same as the guard OK? (-) so because we know Mr
White lives in Manchester
22. AL: yeah
23. E: so here we can make sure that the one lives in London should be
either Mr
24. T: so we know that guard isn’t White
25. AL: Mr (-) the other one
26. C: the guard is not White
27. AL: Mr Green and Mr Brown
28. E: yes this information also shows that White shouldn’t be the
guard
29. T: so we know that the guard could be either Brown or Green (-) and
the ticket inspector could be White or Green
As we have seen above in the previous extract and in E7, group
members apply rules of logic to their problem solving. In fact they
continue applying logical argument of the kind “if p then q.” If the
passenger whose name is the same as the guard lives in London
and, Mr. White lives in Manchester (these are known facts), then
White cannot be the guard. However, they are at a stage where they
cannot provide only one alternative but the two possible options
with two cases for each one. Through logical reasoning, the group
has restricted the possible choices to either Brown or Green for the
guard and either White or Green for the ticket inspector.
In the group interview, members do not focus on their approach
to the problem, as it happened in the intuitive group. This was inter-
preted by the authors as the lack of reasons, by group members, for
questioning their approach to the task because this was for them a
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comfortable setting in which they achieved a successful outcome.
However, their answers suggest certain dimensions on which their
approach to problem solving can be assessed.
During the interview, group members admit that finding the
solution to the problem was very important and that they were ner-
vous about the result. This suggests how task/result-oriented the
group was. They were there to accomplish a task, and finding the
correct result was their only aim. This can also be seen throughout
the exercise transcripts. All participants intervened only with
responses related to the task, no other topics were brought into the
group, even though the group was composed of three colleagues/
friends (A, E, and G) and two other friends (AL and C).
The extract below shows a different interpretive focus from the
previous one. Here participants are focused on their individual
problem-solving type. It appears that group members initially have
to work individually and go through the various steps of the
problem-solving process on an individual basis. In a second
phase, sharing their arguments with the others, they work together
through the solution. The following extract provides group mem-
bers’accounts on the way they have worked and confirms what was
previously inferred.
Extract 8 (Analytic-Interview)
30. C: I can see at the beginning I tried to focus the thing on my own (-)
just to understand what was the problem (-) how to solve it (-) and
then he started to:::
31. ((they all laugh))
32. C: write on a piece of paper in the middle of the table (-) and we all
looked at it and try to find what was (-) there were some different
solutions and we tried to find out which one could be (-) which not
(-) so probably at the beginning (-) I think (-) each one (-) each of us
tried to understand the problem and then we started to really coop-
erate and find out the solution (-) this is the impression that I have (-
) this is how I work (-) I first localize my mind then I work with the
others
33. E: I think that was also what I did at the beginning (-) because was a
bit confusing (-) a bit confusing when you go through the question
and you can’t say (-) really contribute with something to this group
(-) that’s how I feel
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C’s approach to any problem-solving situation (E8, L32: “this is
how I work, I first localize my mind then I work with the others”) is
shared by E, who admits, in E8L33, that at the beginning he used
the same strategy. Whereas C generalizes, implying that she has the
same style regardless of the situation, E is more related to the spe-
cific problem and acknowledges that initially he had to work on his
own because the exercise was confusing and he could not otherwise
contribute to the group. Both C’s and E’s styles to problem solving
confirm the belief that analytic individuals are self-centered and
prefer individual work, though they maintain group cohesion and
collaboration when working in groups (Kirton, 1976).
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE HETEROGENEOUS GROUP
What is interesting in the work-group processes of the heteroge-
neous group is the way group members propose, accept a possible
solution, and then go back to the beginning, refusing the solution
previously accepted. Throughout the transcript, it is possible to see
how members’ heterogeneity is displayed in the disagreement/
conflict between those who want to check every detail and give
the solution only when they feel confident about its correctness,
and others who more easily accept the solution from their problem
solving, even if they cannot demonstrate their full reasons.
These stretches of talk provide evidence of the existence of “dis-
sent” among group members. In the passage below, the group
seems to have reached the final conclusion. Members agree on the
driver’s identity as well as on the guard’s and the ticket inspector’s.
Extract 9 (Heterogeneous-Exercise)
1. P: put down Brown is the driver
2. L: uhm uhm
3. P: *who was the guard?+
4. L: *Green is the guard+ (-) Green is the guard and White is the
ticket inspector (_-) do you all agree with that?
5. F: yeah
6. M: yeah
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However, one notable feature is concerned with the extent to
which the conclusion is the certain and definite one. The following
illustration, in fact, shows how the whole group challenges the ini-
tial agreement and, in doing so, renegotiates the conclusion. The
dynamics of the group during the exercise were played around a
sequence of agreements on the solution and renegotiation of these.
Extract 10 (Heterogeneous-Exercise)
7. P: there is no way to check that?
8. L: if (-) the only way would be if we can totally exclude the other
two alternatives
9. P: uhm
10. L: we have already excluded this one that the guard is White and:: (-)
we totally excluded the possibility that Brown is the guard
11. F: not really (-) ’cause Brown could be the guard
12. M: or Green
13. F: Brown or Green be the guard
14. M: yeah
15. L: I think that you should try to take it out (-) this one (-) whether we
can refuse this (-) *Brown is the guard+ (_) it’s fine anyway
16. M: *that Brown was+ the guard
17. ((they stay quiet for circa 25 seconds reading and writing down on
their own))
18. W: we can’t (-) can you?
19. P: no
During the interview, group members also deploy a reference to
the existing dissent, expressing concerns for their disagreement.
The dissent discourse is also extended to the nature of group work,
which may limit the participation of individual members who have
to compromise their positions with the others. This “negative”
aspect of heterogeneity is later presented under a positive light;
groups composed of different individuals help in prompting the
problem-solving process and legitimizing the solution.
Extract 11 (Heterogeneous-Interview)
20. L: I think you can’t express yourself completely because you have
to coordinate with the others (-) you have sometimes to compro-
mise in order to move on with the task (—) and (-) and each one has
his own rationale (-) you have to find the way to communicate so
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In E11, L goes beyond the solution or any other fundamental
aspect of group problem solving and attempts to give an explana-
tion of their dissent and of the general dissatisfaction. Resources
used by L refer to the “need for coordination,” “finding the right
way of communication,” but also to “limitations to one’s individual
potential” and “compromise.” He draws on these discourses to jus-
tify the group dissent. The dissent between members is emphasized
by the use of the sentence, “Each one has his own rationale.” In par-
ticular, group work is talked about as something that is limitative
for the individual’s possibilities of expression; this is caused by the
fact that a group is composed of members who have different
reasoning processes.
The following passage moves beyond the dissent discourse and
illustrates the disagreement as differences in opinions. However, at
the end of the meeting, these divergences had to converge in one.
Extract 12 (Heterogeneous-Interview)
21. P: we have all thought of different answers and then we worked the
whole out after (-) after a while (-) didn’t we? (-) and then we all
came down with one answer (-) so like everyone had their own
opinion and then it all came down in a one (-) then there was three
of us had the same answer (-) wasn’t there?
22. F: yeah
23. W: wasn’t the case that somebody said we’ve got the answer (-) we
are right (-) oh we were going on (-) we were all (-) well you know
24. P: *yes this is+
The view provided by P moves the attention from the general
problems of group work (as shown in E11) to the specific situation
of their own group. The impression that P projects here is not of a
group with conflicts but a group in which ordinary divergences
existed and were managed to converge in one unanimous answer.
The speaker suggests that initially they all had different solutions,
and after a while they “worked the problem out.” The last part of P’s
turn (E12, L21: “then there was three of us had the same answer”) is
strikingly contradictory. The group was composed of six members,
and if only three of them (P includes himself in this group) had the
same answer, it means that the three remaining members had differ-
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ent opinions. W (E12, L23) expresses a position that is much closer
to the idea of conflict. Although his language is rather implicit and
vague, his sentence suggests that the process of reaching an agree-
ment was long and difficult (“we were going on”).
SUMMARY OF THE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE THREE GROUPS
Going through the transcripts and then the discourse analysis of
the groups, an important element becomes evident: In the three
groups (intuitive, analytic, and heterogeneous), behavior strongly
differs with regard to the approach participants applied to the problem-
solving situation. The first aspect that becomes apparent is the way in
which group members’discourses are constructed and modeled by
the interaction between the individual style and the task. The
approach of discourse analysis and the focus on both forms and
meanings of a spoken text enabled us to see how the nature of problem-
solving style (or cognitive style) interacts with the task to structure the
situation in which the work groups accomplished their exercise.
In the analysis of the intuitivist group (problem solving as well
as interview), we can see that members are faced with a complex
and problematic dilemma of how to approach the task, the manage-
ment of which has important implications for the solution of the
problem. The group struggled in dealing with the task and gave the
wrong solution; members had foresight to probe their approach and
asked themselves whether there were “incompatibilities” between
their way of approaching the problem and the nature of the problem
itself. This issue did not seem to exist for the analytic group. Mem-
bers, in fact, just got on with the task and provided the solution
within the given time. Also, during the interview, the analytic group
members did not specifically refer to their style in approaching the
problem. They found themselves comfortable in that setting and,
having successfully solved the problem, they did not have reasons
for questioning their approach.
A further element of difference between the groups is concerned
with the perception that members have of their group. Both the
intuitivist and the analytic groups referred to the cooperation and
the complementarities existing between members. In the intuitivist
Priola et al. / GROUP WORK AND COGNITIVE STYLE 587
group, a member recognized that they all were alike, that they all
understood each other and had the same thought process. Analytic
group members also acknowledged that the collaboration that
existed between them was a means of satisfaction and the cause of
their success in accomplishing the task. By way of contrast, dis-
agreements and conflicts were experienced in the heterogeneous
group, where members had to compromise to provide a final solu-
tion. They also acknowledged that this was because the group was
composed of members who used different reasoning processes.
To summarize, we suggest that a central feature of the processes
that take place in work groups and teams is concerned with the cog-
nitive style of group members. In this case, the nature of behaviors
that were initiated by group members to accomplish the task was, at
least partially, a function of members’cognitive style. On the other
hand, the environment in which groups had to do their work was
organized as a fixed setting with a prescribed task characterized by
an array of constraints that members could barely influence. This
seemed to have favored one type of group (the analytic) compared
with the other (the intuitivist).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Focusing on the differences across the linguistic dispositions
emerging in the three groups (intuitive, analytic, and heteroge-
neous), the study confirmed what is reported in the literature
regarding the characteristics of intuitive and analytic individuals.
According to previous research (e.g., Allinson & Hayes, 1996;
Honey & Mumford, 1982; Witkin & Goodenough, 1977), analytic
individuals prefer a more structured and logically oriented environ-
ment and find themselves comfortable in situations in which a
gradual analysis is required. Intuitivist individuals, on the other
hand, prefer a more open, unprompted, and ambiguous environ-
ment and find it difficult to adapt to a situation that requires a sys-
tematic examination. An important fact to keep in mind is that the
mechanistic setting that characterized this study is the most com-
monly used in psychology research into cognitive style, which
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tends to be experimental and laboratory oriented. This may account
for the correspondence between the findings of this study and
previous research reported in the literature.
The study showed that analytics are more concerned with a step-
by-step analysis of the task, and implemented a logical reasoning
process that led them to the correct solution of the problem within
the given time. It also showed that intuitivists are more feeling-oriented
rather than logical and rational. Using Burns and Stalker’s (1961) termi-
nology, we can say that analytic individuals are more mechanistic ori-
ented, whereas intuitivists are more organic oriented. Thus, we can
also say that analytics are more comfortable and work better in a
structured and clearly defined environment, whereas intuitivists
would perform better in a situation that requires the adjustment of
individual tasks through interaction with others and nonprecise
definition of obligations and rights.
The present study acquires a greater value when considered
alongside the previous investigation by Armstrong and Priola
(2001). This present investigation supports what is reported in the
literature, but when considered in conjunction with the first study, it
also challenges the view of constant and coherent behavior across
situations. This does not imply that the observation of the behavior
of analytics and intuitives, individuals and teams, in both settings
favors a situationist explanation, but it highlights the importance of
personality variables within different situations and suggests that
the cognitive style may explain behavior even though the behavior
varies from situation to situation (see also Gruenfeld & Lin, 1984).
To interpret these findings, we need to consider other aspects
that may be involved in the group processes, rather than be limited
to the simple and isolated relationship between the cognitive
framework of the team members and their behavior in the group.
The authors suggest that the relationship between individual differ-
ences and group processes cannot be explored as an isolated sys-
tem. While performing a group task, individuals are certainly influ-
enced by their cognitive style; however, in their ways of responding
to the task, they are also affected by the characteristics of the task
itself and the conditions of the setting (see also Gruenfeld & Lin,
1984). These aspects must be taken into consideration if the
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researcher is to produce a valuable account of the research problem
investigated.
Previously, research has acknowledged (e.g., Gruenfeld & Lin,
1984; Armstrong & Priola, 2001) that an organic setting influenced
the conduct of the intuitivists, who focused on social but also on
task behavior. It also influenced the behavior of the analytics, who
could not easily engage with the vague task. In this study, it seems
that the mechanistic and strictly defined task has also had an impact
on the behavior of the intuitivists and analytics. The intuitivists
could not relate to the task, neither could they find the right solu-
tion. They focused on maintaining the group cohesiveness and the
group integrity against the external, hostile, and undecipherable
setting (the exercise). The analytics comfortably and successfully
implemented the logical thought process required by the kind of
problem, which corresponded to their preferred problem-solving
style.
A relevant aspect that characterized this study was the possibil-
ity of measuring group success or failure in solving the problem.
Although the issue was not a major concern of the research, the
results may have implications for practical applications of team-
work. Previous research (e.g., Frank & Davis, 1982) showed that
analytics (field independent) performed significantly better when
matched, whereas intuitives (field dependent) performed less well
when matched than when mismatched. Although research into
matched-mismatched cognitive style is limited to the observation
of dyads within a mechanistic setting (the accomplishment of a pre-
scribed problem-solving task), these findings are worthy of consid-
eration and may assist in understanding the reasons for the failure
of the intuitive group to give the correct solution to the mechanistic
task. It may be that intuitive individuals are less efficient at synthe-
sizing and integrating the information available, in this case in the
form of clues, and that their holistic approach may have prevented
them from considering alternative strategies.
Whereas the main research question focuses on the behavior of
intuitive and analytic groups, an important aspect has been high-
lighted by the discourse analysis of the heterogeneous group. This,
in fact, has confirmed an important issue concerned with group
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conflict and has led to a stronger emphasis on the group polariza-
tion emerging from the analysis of the two homogeneous groups. In
both situations, the exercise and the interview, the analysis of the
heterogeneous group identified the existence of a strong disagree-
ment between group members. This was concerned not only with
the final solution of the problem but also with the various modali-
ties that could have been implemented by the group to explore and
address the problem. Group members themselves acknowledged
this dissent during the interview, recognizing that the need for
group coordination implies making compromise with the different
individuals’ positions. Group members admit their dissent, grant-
ing the employment of different rationales by different participants
and thus acknowledging that the group was composed of members
who had different reasoning processes.
The dissent within the heterogeneous group assumes a more
powerful meaning when considered within a comparative view and
in the light of the group polarization and unity existing in the two
homogeneous groups. The recognition by group members of the
diversity (in the case of the heterogeneous group) and similarity (in
the case of the two homogeneous groups) in their thought processes
is an important point that emphasizes and provides stronger legiti-
mization to the importance of individual differences in group work.
Whereas it has been previously outlined that person and situa-
tion are interdependent in affecting behavior, it has also been rec-
ognized that often during the design of research projects, the com-
plexity of reality cannot be fully embraced, as in the case of the
present study. Rather than finding ways to overcome the problem,
this has led researchers to a specialization, which has constrained
the field of research to two separate areas of investigations. Within
these opposed areas, some authors focus on personality issues and
others prefer a more situationist approach. This study has high-
lighted an important research issue which is intrinsic within a lim-
ited framework of observation and the methods of gathering and
analyzing data. This concerns the resources that a particular
research design and the quantitative and qualitative methods pro-
vide in guiding toward the reasons for particular results.
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In summary, within the framework of multimethods, multi-
settings research, this study highlights the importance of personal-
ity variables within different settings and suggests that situational
specificity of behavior is itself an aspect of personality. According
to Magnuson and Endler (1977), the process of interaction between
person and situation cannot be discussed as a cause-and-effect rela-
tionship, with persons and situations as the causal factors and
behavior as the effect. Behavior in groups is an inseparable aspect
of the person and her/his interaction with the setting, considered in
its social characteristics and its task characteristics.
The present study, when viewed in conjunction with the previ-
ously published investigation by Armstrong and Priola (2001),
demonstrates how methodological triangulation can enhance our
understanding of the ways in which individuals participate in a
work group. Methodological diversity may help the researcher
reduce the limitations of the particular view through which the
investigation is shaped with the adoption of a different view
according to the different method. The authors strongly believe that
no one method is superior to the others and that through breaking
up monopolies, we can really expand our knowledge (Priola &
Smith, 2001).
Armstrong and Priola’s (2001) study, conducted in a natural set-
ting and using a quantitative methodology, showed that intuitive
individuals and intuitive teams participated with more social-oriented
but also with more task-oriented behaviors, compared with analytic
individuals and analytic teams. The process of reducing human
interactions to numbers helped the researchers to identify the exist-
ing relationship between cognitive style and group processes, but it
did not assist in understanding the relationship between group
members and the task. The process of counting the frequency of
behaviors has led to the concealing of the quality of the experience
and the processes that influenced the behavior of group members.
This became evident in the study here reported, which examined
the quality of group members’ interactions and how members dealt
with the specific setting. Additionally, through the discourse analy-
sis of the group exercise and the interview, participants were
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directly involved in the processes of understanding and explaining
their experience.
NOTES
1. Psychometric properties of the Cognitive Style Index are reported in Allinson and
Hayes (1996), Armstrong, Allinson, and Hayes (1997, 2003), Murphy, Kelleher, Doucette,
and Young (1998), and Priola (2001).
2. The exercise was adapted from Night Shift Enterprises, Advanced Group Work Exer-
cises: A Resource for Youth Workers and Trainers.
3. In the analysis, “E” refers to extract and “L” refers to line. Initials of the participants are
underlined to avoid confusion with E and L.
4. Rotter’s dimension of locus of control has been included by Furnham, Brewin, and
O’Kelly (1994) in the general family of cognitive styles.
REFERENCES
Allinson, C. W., & Hayes, J. (1996). The Cognitive Style Index: A measure of intuition-
analysis for organizational research. Journal of Management Studies, 33(1), 119-135.
Armstrong, S. J., Allinson, C. W., & Hayes, J. (1997). The implications of cognitive style for
the management of student-supervisor relationships. Educational Psychology, 17, 209-
217.
Armstrong, S. J., Allinson, C. W., & Hayes, J. (2003). Formal mentoring systems: An exami-
nation of the effects of mentor/protégé cognitive style on the mentoring process. Journal
of Management Studies, 39, 1111-1137.
Armstrong, S. J., & Priola, V. (2001). Individual differences in cognitive style and their effect
on task and social orientations of self managed work-teams, Small Group Research,
32(3), 283-312.
Bales, R. F. (1950). Interaction process analysis: A method for the study of small groups.
Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Bales, R. F., Cohen, S. P., & Williamson S. A. (1979). SYMLOG: A System for the Multiple
Level Observation of Groups. New York: Free Press.
Banister, P., Burman, E., Parker, I., Taylor, M., & Tindall, C. (1994). Qualitative methods in
psychology: A research guide. Buckingham, England: Open University Press.
Belbin, R. M. (1981). Management teams: Why they succeed or fail. Oxford, England:
Butterworth-Heinemann.
Belbin, R. M. (1993). Team roles at work. London: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Bion, W. R. (1961). Experiences in group and other papers. London: Tavistock.
Burns, T., & Stalker, G. M. (1961). The management of innovation. London: Tavistock.
Ellis, D. G., & Fisher, B. A. (1994). Small group decision making: Communication and the
group process (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and social change. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.
Priola et al. / GROUP WORK AND COGNITIVE STYLE 593
Frank, B. M., & Davis, J. K. (1982). Effect of field-independence match or mismatch on a
communication task, Journal of Educational Psychology, 74(1), 23-31.
Furnham, A., Brewin, C. R., & O’Kelly, H. (1994). Cognitive style and attitude to work,
Human Relations, 47(12), 1509-1521.
Gruenfeld, L. W., & Lin, T.-R. (1984). Social behavior of field independents and dependents
in an organic group. Human Relations, 37, 721-741.
Hackman, J. R., & Morris, C. G. (1975). Group tasks, group interaction process, and group
performance effectiveness: A review and proposed integration. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),
Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 1-99). New York: Academic Press.
Honey, P., & Mumford, A. (1982). The manual of learning styles. Maidenhead, England:
Honey.
Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Jaques, D. (1991). Learning in groups (2nd ed.). London: Kogan Page.
Kirton, M. J. (1976). Adaptors and innovators: A description and measure. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 42, 622-629.
Kogan, N. (1983). Stylistic variation in childhood and adolescence: Creativity, metaphor and
cognitive style. In P. H. Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael’s manual of child (Vol. 3, pp. 630-
706). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Leonard, D., & Straus, S. (1997, July). Putting your company’s whole brain to work. Harvard
Business Review, 111-121.
Littlepage, G. E., Cowart, L., & Kerr, B. (1989). Relationship between group environment
scales and group performance and cohesiveness. Small Group Behavior, 20(1), 50-61.
Magnuson, D., & Endler, N. S. (1977). Interactional psychology: Present status and future
prospects. In D. Magnuson & N. S. Endler (Eds.), Personality at the crossroads: Current
issues in interactional psychology (pp. 641-655). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Miller, A. (1987). Cognitive styles: an integrated model. Educational Psychology, 7(4), 251-
268.
Murphy, H. J., Kelleher, W. E., Doucette, P. A., & Young, J. D. (1998). Test-retest reliability
and construct validity of the Cognitive Style Index for business undergraduates. Psycho-
logical Reports, 82, 595-600.
Napier, R. W., & Gershenfeld, M. K. (1984). Groups: Theory and experience (2nd ed.).
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Pomerantz, A. (1986). Extreme case formulations: A way of legitimising claims. Human
Studies, 9, 219-229.
Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and
behaviour. London: Sage.
Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1989). Fragmented ideologies: Accounts of educational failure
and positive discrimination, Text, 9(2), 175-190.
Priola, V. (2001). Management of group work: A multi-methodological study of the implica-
tions of cognitive style on group processes. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University
of Sunderland, England.
Priola, V., & Smith, J. L. (2001, July). The chameleon researcher: Multiple paradigms for
inquiry in social science. Paper presented at the British Psychological Society, Social
Psychology Section Annual Conference, Surrey, England.
Riding, R., & Cheema, I. (1991). Cognitive style: An overview and integration. Educational
Psychology, 11(3/4), 193-215.
Riding, R. J., Glass, A., & Douglas, G. (1993). Individual differences in thinking: Cognitive
and neurophysiological perspectives. Educational Psychology, 13(3/4), 267-279.
594 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2004
Riding, R., & Rayner, S. (1998). Cognitive style and learning strategies: Understanding
style differences in learning and behaviour. London: David Fulton.
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of rein-
forcement, Psychological Monographs, 80.
Sbisá, M. (1992). Affetto e Diritto come dimensioni dell’interazione verbale [Affection and
law as dimensions in verbal interaction]. In C. Galimberti (Ed.), La Conversazione.
Prospettive sull’interazione verbale. Milano, Italy: Guerini.
Schrage, (1995). No more teams! New York: Doubleday/Currency.
Sinclair, A. (1992). The tyranny of a team ideology. Organization Studies, 13, 611-626.
Turk, D. C., & Salovey, P. (Eds.). (1988). Reasoning inference and judgement in clinical psy-
chology. New York: The Free Press.
Witkin, H. A. (1976). A cognitive style in academic performance and in teacher-student
selections. In S. Messick (Ed.), Individuality in learning (pp. 38-72). San Francisco:
Josey-Bass.
Witkin, H. A., & Goodenough, D. R. (1977). Field dependence and interpersonal behavior.
Psychological Bulletin, 84, 661-689.
Witkin, H. A., Goodenough, D. R., & Karp, S. A. (1967). Stability of cognitive style from child-
hood to young adulthood. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7(3), 291-300.
Zaccaro, S. J. (1991). Nonequivalent associations between forms of cohesiveness and group-
related outcomes: Evidence for multidimensionality. Journal of Social Psychology,
131(3), 387-399.
Zaccaro, S. J., & Lowe, C. A. (1988). Cohesiveness and performance on an additive task:
Evidence for multidimensionality. Journal of Social Psychology, 128(4), 547-558.
Vincenza Priola is a senior lecturer in organizational psychology at The University of
Wolverhampton Business School in the United Kingdom. Her current research inter-
ests focus on the management of work teams, gender, and research methodologies.
John L. Smith is a reader in social psychology and director of research (psychology)
at Sunderland University Business School in the United Kingdom. His interests lie in
the psychology of action, the psychology of food and eating, and postpositivist social
psychology.
Steven J. Armstrong is a reader in organizational behavior and director of the Centre
for Management and Organisational Learning at Hull University Business School.
His research interests lie in the field of individual differences psychology, and he is
particularly interested in how differences in cognitive style affect the way individuals
relate to one another, solve problems, make decisions, and communicate ideas in the
workplace.
Priola et al. / GROUP WORK AND COGNITIVE STYLE 595
